Researchers from Technische Universität Berlin have demonstrated physical attacks that bypass PIN lockout protections in Windows Hello and BitLocker, allowing short PINs to be guessed much faster than the security mechanisms normally permit.
The attacks target how firmware-based Trusted Platform Modules (fTPMs) track failed PIN attempts. These security components help protect Windows sign-ins and encryption keys by delaying repeated guesses. Many computers store their TPM state, including failed-attempt counters, in flash memory on the motherboard.
The researchers found that weaknesses in the mechanisms designed to prevent this information from being rolled back can allow attackers to reset those counters and continue guessing. On certain AMD systems, an attacker can interfere with flash memory counter updates without the processor detecting the failure. A separate weakness in some Winbond flash chips allows attackers to forge protected counter values through a hardware voltage-glitch attack.
AMD has acknowledged one of the underlying vulnerabilities and is preparing firmware updates for affected processors.
Researchers Demonstrate Faster PIN Guessing
In laboratory tests, the researchers recovered a four-digit Windows Hello PIN from an AMD-powered HP OmniBook 3 in 57 minutes after 236 attempts. Windows still required restarts after repeated incorrect guesses, but the TPM’s usual lockout delays did not take effect.
A second demonstration targeted a Framework Laptop 13 with an Intel processor and Winbond flash memory. Researchers recovered a six-digit BitLocker startup PIN in less than seven minutes, also after 236 attempts.
The team estimated that bypassing these protections could reduce the worst-case time required to guess a four-digit Windows Hello PIN from approximately 69 days to 40 hours. For a six-digit BitLocker PIN, the estimate dropped from 19 years to about 20 days.
Both demonstrations required physical access, hardware modifications and specialized equipment. They do not establish that Windows Hello or BitLocker can be bypassed remotely.
AMD Plans Firmware Fixes
AMD identified its firmware vulnerability as CVE-2026-43613, assigning it a CVSS severity score of 5.1. The company has scheduled mitigations for affected processor families, with target release dates ranging from November 2026 through February 2027.
The Winbond weakness is separate from AMD’s firmware flaw and involves the flash memory hardware, meaning AMD’s firmware updates do not directly address that issue.
Until mitigations are available, the researchers recommend adding at least two digits to Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs to increase the time required for brute-force attacks. AMD also advises maintaining physical control of devices and watching for signs of tampering.
The researchers warn that a recovered Windows Hello PIN could potentially expose additional device-bound credentials, including those used for enterprise single sign-on. That broader scenario was not demonstrated in their tests.

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